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Abstract. Estimating a deterministic single value for model parameters when1
reconstructing the system response has a limited meaning if one considers that the2
model used to predict its behavior is just an idealization of reality, and furthermore,3
the existence of measurements errors. To provide a suitable answer, probabilistic4
instead of deterministic values should be provided, which carry information about5
the degree of uncertainty or plausiblity of those model parameters providing one6
or more observations of the system response. This is widely-known as the Bayesian7
Inverse Problem, which has been covered in the literature from different perspectives,8
depending on the interpretation or the meaning assigned to the probability. In this9
paper, we revise two main approaches: the one that uses probability as logic, and an10
alternative one that interprets it as a information content. The contribution of this11
paper is to highlight their similarities and differences, and eventually provide their12
links as an unifying formulation. An extension to the problem of model class selection13
is derived, which is particularly simple under the proposed framework.14
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1. Probability interpretation in physical phenomena19
It is unanimously agreed that statistics depends somehow on probability.
But, as to what probability is and how it is connected with statistics,
there has seldom been such complete disagreement and breakdown of
communication since the Tower of Babel. Doubtless, much of the
disagreement is merely terminological and would disappear under
sufficiently sharp analysis. However there is a fundamental difference
between frequentist and bayesian interpretations that cannot be bridged.
Savage, 1972 [1]
20
The main statistical frameworks on which inverse problems and inference rely on21
have rigorously been legitimated after a long history [2]. The following could be an22
attempt to classify the sequence of physical interpretations of probability:23
Classical: if a random experiment can result in a finite number n of mutually exclusive24
and equally likely outcomes and if nA of these outcomes result in the occurrence of25
the event A, the probability of A was defined by Laplace as,26
P (A) =
nA
n
(1)
Frequentist: the probability of an event A is its relative frequency of occurrence after27
repeating a process a large number n of trials under similar conditions,28
P (A) = lim
n→∞
nA
n
(2)
This definition is commonly used as a physical meaning (R. A. Fisher, J. Neyman29
and E. Pearson [3, 4, 5, 6]). If the process is repeated a reduced series of times,30
different relative frequencies will be obtained in different series of trials. If these31
relative frequencies are to define the probability, the probability of event A will32
be non-unique. If we acknowledge the fact that we only can estimate a probability33
we still get into problems as the error of estimation can only be expressed as a34
probability, the very concept we are trying to define. This renders the frequency35
definition circular. Hence the relative frequency of a event A informs, but does36
not define, the parameter representing the probability of the event in a probability37
model.38
Evidential or propensity: the theory of evidential probability studies the impact39
of evidence on probability. It is motivated by two basic ideas [7]: (i) probability40
assessments should be based on known relative frequencies, and the assignment41
of probability to specific individual events should be based on its the available42
information history, and (ii) Humphreys paradox [8] shows how propensities do43
not obey Kolmogorov’s probability calculus, and reads as follows. Probability44
calculus implies Bayes’ theorem, which allows us to invert a conditional probability45
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)/P (B), whereas propensities are intented to be interpreted46
as measures of causal trends, and since the causal relation is not necessarily47
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symmetric, these propensities should not invert. Humphrey’s paradox is illustrated48
by supposing a test for an illness that occasionally gives false positives and false49
negatives. A given sick patient may have a propensity to give a positive test result,50
but it apparently makes no sense to say that a given positive test result has a51
propensity to have come from a sick patient. Thus, propensities, whatever they52
are, must not obey the usual probability calculus: "if the probability of B, given53
A exists, then the probability of A, given B exists, however one understands these54
conditional probabilities". Fetzer and Nute [9] formulated a probabilistic causal55
calculus different from Kolmogorov’s calculus.56
Logical: the probability P [H|E] is interpreted as the degree of plausibility of a57
proposition H (typically a hypothesis) given the information in the proposition E58
(typically empirical evidence). Logical probabilities are thus objective, logical59
relations between propositions [10, 11] (states of knowledge), in contrast to the60
physical propensity of a phenomenon. This views allows to build the Bayesian61
inference: to compute the posterior probability of a hypothesis, some specified62
prior probability known about it is updated by new knowledge or data. In contrast63
to assigning a probability to a hypothesis, in frequentist probability, hypothesis are64
just formally tested.65
Cox [12] postulates enable logical probability interpretation to be applied to any66
proposition, when supported by new gained information, as a natural extension of67
Aristotelian logic (by which statements are either true or false) into the realm of68
reasoning in the presence of uncertainty:69
(i) "A double negative is an affirmative" becomes a functional equation f(f(x)) =70
x.71
(ii) The plausibility of the conjunction [A&B] of two propositions A, B, depends72
only on the plausibility of B and that of A given that B is true, P (A&B) =73
P (A)P (B|A).74
(iii) Suppose [A&B] is equivalent to [C&D]. If we acquire new information A75
and then acquire further new information B, and update all probabilities76
each time, the updated probabilities will be the same as if we had first77
acquired new information C and then acquired further new information D,78
yf
(
f(z)
y
)
= zf
(
f(y)
z
)
.79
Cox [12] derived the laws of probability from these postulates, which are, assuming80
that the scale of information measurement ranges from zero to one:81
(i) Certainty is represented by P (A|B) = 1.82
(ii) Negation: P (A|B) + P (A|B) = 1.83
(iii) Conjunction: P (A,B|C) = P (A|C)P (B|A,C) = P (B|C)P (A|B,C).84
These laws yield finite additivity of probability, but not countable additivity.85
Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability, which assume that a probability measure is86
countably additive (necessary for the proof of certain theorems) are,87
(i) Non-negativity: P (A) ≥ 0.88
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(ii) Finite additivity: P (A ∪ B) = P (A) + P (B) ∀ A,B|A ∩B = ∅.89
(iii) Normalization: P (Ω) = 1.90
Kolmogorov comments that infinite probability spaces are idealized models of real91
random processes, and that he limits himself arbitrarily to only those models that92
satisfy countable additivity. This axiom is the cornerstone of the assimilation of93
probability theory to measure theory [2]. The conditional probability of A given B94
is then given by the ratio of unconditional probabilities,95
P (A|B) =
P (A ∩ B)
P (B)
, P (B) > 0 (3)
Subjective: probabilities are understood as degrees of rational belief [11], rather than96
logical relations that constrain degrees of rational belief. Ramsey [13] questioned97
the existence of such objective logical relations and redefined evidential probability98
as "the logic of partial belief".99
Outside physical uses, subjective or personalist probability, and epistemic100
or inductive probability have recently been developed as an incompatible101
interpretations to the frequentist one [14].102
Predictive inference: stems from Bayesian probability of physical phenomena with103
errors by assuming De Finetti’s [15] idea of exchangeability: that future104
observations should behave like past observations, and the concept of cross-105
validation [16].106
2. Modeling assumptions107
The goal of the inverse problem is to use the observed response of a system to improve108
a single or a set of models that idealize that system, so that they make more accurate109
predictions of the system response to a prescribed, or uncertain, excitation.110
Following the Bayesian formulation of the inverse problem [17], the solution is not111
a single-valued set of model parameters θ. On the contrary, Bayes’ Theorem takes112
the initial quantification of the plausibility of each model parameterized by θ, which is113
expressed by the prior probability distribution, and updates this plausibility by using114
the information in the data set D, to obtain the posterior probability distribution of115
model parameters.116
The origin of the uncertainties are built into the interpretation of probability117
as a measure of relative plausibility of the various possibilities conditional to118
available information. This interpretation is not well known in the engineering119
community where there is a wide-spread belief that probability only applies to aleatory120
uncertainty (inherent randomness in nature) and not to epistemic uncertainty (missing121
information). Jaynes [18] noted that the assumption of inherent randomness is an122
example of what he called the Mind-Projection Fallacy: our uncertainty is ascribed123
to an inherent property of nature, or, more generally, our models of reality are confused124
with reality.125
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The interpretation of the final inferred model probability can be used either126
to identify a set of plausible values, or to find the most probable one (expected),127
or, following Tarantola [17], just to falsify inconsistent models, since according to128
Popper [19], that is the only thing we can assert.129
Furthermore, different model parameterizations or even model hypothesis130
representing different physics can be formulated and hypothesized to idealize the system,131
yielding a set of different (Bayesian) model classes [20],M = {M1, . . . ,MNM}, resulting132
different values of model hypothesis or classes.133
2.1. Notation134
From the above description, we highlight three important pieces of information in the135
Bayesian inverse problem, which are described here:136
D : data set containing the system output (or input-output couple, depending on the137
experimental setup). It can be either the real output Dreal, or the ideal output to138
be predicted Dideal, or the measured output Dobs. Each of them may belong to139
different spaces, but need to be comparable in the sense that they can be related.140
Mj : jth model class or candidate among alternative model classes hypothesized to141
idealize the system. A Bayesian model class can be defined by two fundamental142
probability models: an input-output (I/O) model {p(Dideal|u,θ,Mj) : θ ∈ Θ ⊂143
R
Np} and a prior probability distribution p(θ|Mj), that gives a initial relative144
plausibility of model parameters defining the I/O model in the class. Here u denotes145
the inputs to the system.146
θ : set of uncertain model parameters within a specific model class Mj, that calibrate147
the idealized relationships between input and output of the system.148
All the defined variables (output data Dreal, Dideal, Dobs, model parameters θ149
or model classes Mj) are defined to lie in manifolds D
real, Dideal, Dobs, M and Θ,150
respectively.151
2.2. Real and ideal system definitions152
When observing a real system using prior knowledge about of the physics that governs153
it, idealized by a model, careful analysis needs to be made about how to combine the154
elements of these two pieces of information: observations+model.155
The first step is to identify which elements of the real system under observation156
plays a relevant role. Figure 1 schematizes these elements and their relationships. When157
a physics-based idealization of the system is required, it should follow a parallel scheme158
to the real one (lower half of the same figure), where all elements are connected by defined159
relationships. To sum up, the Inverse Problem can be defined as the counterpart of the160
Forward Problem (aimed at computing the unknown output Dideal of a known idealized161
system g(θ)), i.e. computing an unknown part of the system (θ) given some observable162
part of the output Dobs.163
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Reality
Idealization
System
Parametrized
System g
Model, model class
θ, M
Measurement error
emeas
Prediction error
epred
SensorOutput
Dreal
Observation
Dobs
Ideal
Sensor
Output
Dideal=g(θ)
Observation
Dideal
-
Computational 
error
enum
Output
Dnum=g(θ)
-
Figure 1. Scheme of real and ideal systems. Note that system input may not
necessarily appear explicitly outside the system. In the mathematical idealization,
second half, an ideal sensor is conceived with the peculiarity that it is assumed to
perfectly interrogate the system output introducing no error or bias.
Note from the figure that the noise in the sensors groups any type of difference164
between observed and real data, including sensor error (characterized by a probability165
model) and quantization in the case of digital sensors, yielding the relationship,166
Dobs = Dreal + emeas (4)
On the other hand, the assumptions required in the process of idealization of reality are167
responsible for the differences between real and ideal output,168
Dreal = Dideal + epred (5)
Then169
Dobs = Dideal + epred + emeas (6)
For some instruments, the measurement errors can be neglected in comparison to170
modeling errors, thus the last equation can be rewritten as,171
Dobs = Dideal + epred (7)
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3. IP formulation from the probability logic viewpoint172
Following the probability logic formulation of the inverse problem established by173
Beck [21, 20], the solution is not a single-valued set of optimal model parameters θ∗174
but a conditional PDF of the values of the model parameters θ given a set of data D175
and a model classM: p(θ|D,M). The probability density p is assigned the meaning of176
relative plausibility of the model values θ to be true given D and M.177
3.1. Assumptions178
Bayesian probabilities in probability logic are always conditioned, i.e. the probability179
P [b|c] is interpreted as the degree of plausibility of proposition b given the information180
in proposition c, whose truth we need not know.181
The definition is based on logical operators according to Cox [12]. The arbitrary182
mapping φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] for defining the conjunction is taken to be the simplest183
possible definition: the identity. The probability logic axioms based on Boolean logic184
and Cox’s postulate are adopted.185
3.2. Formulation in the case of perfect observations186
Let’s start assuming perfect observations in the sense that the discrepancy due to187
sensor and idealization is negligible, Dreal = Dideal = Dobs = D. Given observations188
D consisting of measured outputs or pairs of outputs response to inputs to the system,189
their updated relative plausibility can be quantified by p(θ|D,M) for the uncertain190
model parameters θ within the model class M. Using Bayes’ Theorem:191
p(θ|D,M) = c−1p(D|θ,M)p(θ|M) (8)
where c = p(D|M) =
∫
Θ
p(D|θ,M)p(θ|M)dθ is a normalizing constant called the192
evidence of data set D for the model classM; p(D|θ,M) is the likelihood function that193
quantifies the probability of getting the observations D by the I/O model specified by θ194
in the the model class M; and p(θ|M) is the prior PDF assigned to model parameter195
values θ within M (usually chosen to provide regularization of ill-conditioned inverse196
problems). ‡197
3.3. Formulation for ideal, real and observed output198
The case of presence of sensor noise or prediction error can be derived from the199
relationships in Equations 4 and 5. In the probability logic framework, the relations200
among ideal, real and observed outputs are derived from conditional probability and a201
subsequent marginalization, as follows,202
‡ Note that, in equation (10) and the sequel, Mj has been replaced by M for compactness.
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p(Dreal,Dideal) = p(Dreal|Dideal)p(Dideal) where the conditional probability203
p(Dreal|Dideal) incorporates the prediction error. In the case of perfect idealization,204
this conditional probability is just the identity.205
p(Dreal,Dobs) = p(Dreal|Dobs)p(Dobs) where the conditional probability206
p(Dreal|Dobs) incorporates the measurement noise (sensor error, bias and207
quantization). Examples of this conditional probability are given in Figure 2.208
n Dreal
p
Dobs
Dreal
Dobs
Dreal
Figure 2. Examples of probability density relating real and ideal output though the
error prediction. Left and center: case of perfect measurement with only quantization
(center: slice for a single value of Dobs. Right: case of sensor with quantization and
uncertainty. Gray tones stand for probability densities, being white null probability,
and black maximum probability.
The observed data can be transformed to ideal data, as209
p(Dreal) =
∫
Dobs
p(Dreal|Dideal)p(Dideal)dDobs ⇒
p(Dideal) =
∫
Dreal
∫
Dobs
p(Dideal|Dreal)p(Dreal|Dobs)p(Dobs)dDobsdDreal (9)
that can subsequently be used to update the ideal model, as210
p(θ|Dideal,M) = c−1p(Dideal|θ,M)p(θ|M) (10)
4. IP formulation from the conjunction of states of information viewpoint211
The relationship between the model and the observations provided by a model need not212
to be an implication due to a cause-effect, which would require to define the conditional213
probability p(θ|D,M). Instead, just the joint probability density f(θ,D,M) needs214
to be defined in the following approach, in which the causality between model and215
observations may be inverted or even not exist.216
This formulation does not use conditional probabilities as a elementary notion of217
information and in turn it uses joint probabilities obtained as a conjunction of states of218
information [17]. The last two points can be considered as strengths of the formulation.219
Logical inference for inverse problems 9
4.1. Assumptions220
The output data (real Dreal, ideal Dideal and observed Dobs) reside in their own221
independent manifolds. These manifolds do not need to be intersecting as long as222
Equations 4 and 5 need not to be written. As defined above, all the variables (output223
data Dreal, Dideal, Dobs, model parameters θ or model classes Mj) are defined in their224
manifolds Dreal, Dideal, Dobs,Θ and M, respectively.225
An event or realization of them is defined by a region or subset A. The information226
about them (which is an idealized construct) is defined by a measure (P (A)) that satisfies227
the first two Kolmogorov axioms (P (A) ≥ 0, P (A∪B) = P (A)+P (B) ∀ A,B|A∩B = ∅).228
By Radon-Nikodym theorem, a density f(x) can be defined,229
P (A) =
∫
A
f(x)dx (11)
and the Kolmogorov normality P (Ω) = 1 is not assumed.230
The logical inference operations on the information defined above has been defined231
elsewhere, but can be summarized as follows. Starting from the and and or operator232
definition for Boolean logic,233
a b Pa ∧ Pb Pa ∨ Pb
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
234
Without assuming normality, the following relationship are compatible, using De235
Morgan’s law,236
Pa(A) 6= 0 or Pb(A) 6= 0 ⇒ (Pa ∨ Pb)A 6= 0
Pa(A) = 0 or Pb(A) = 0 ⇒ (Pa ∧ Pb)A = 0
(12)
Commutativity is also allowed,237
Pa ∨ Pb = Pb ∨ Pa Pa ∧ Pb = Pb ∧ Pa (13)
The simplest solution that fulfills these axioms without normalization is§,238 {
f1 ∨ f2 = f1 + f2
f1 ∧ f2 = f1f2
(14)
§ This solution is consistent as long as the parameters (observations, model parameters, etc.) are
Jeffrey’s parameters [17]. If not, the probability densities f(y) just need to be divided by the
noninformative probability density µ(y), i.e. replacing f(y) by f(y)
µ(y) everytime.
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4.2. Case of perfect observations239
For presenting the idea behind the formulation in a simpler way, the case when240
observations are perfect, i.e. discrepancy due to sensor or idealization is negligible,241
Dreal = Dideal = Dobs = D is presented without loss of generality.242
Assume that the system under test is defined by observations, model parameter243
and idealized model classes. If we have two sources of information (probabilistic244
propositions) to infer information about the model parameters f(θ), which are that245
originated by experimental observations of the system f o, and that originated from a246
mathematical model of the system fm, the probabilistic logic conjunction operator allows247
to compute the information state that the system parameters fulfill both propositions248
simultaneously, f o ∧ fm, as,249
f(D,θ,M) = f o(D,θ,M) ∧ fm(D,θ,M) = f o(D,θ,M)fm(D,θ,M) (15)
Assuming that the experimental information on observations is carried out with250
sensors that are independent on techniques to infer experimental information on model251
parameters, and the same is true for model classes, the joint density can be split as the252
product f o(D,θ,M) = f o(D)f o(θ)f o(M). This is not true for the model information253
fm, since it relates observations and model.254
By reusing the mentioned Radon-Nikodym theorem on the density defined in
Equation 15, the marginal density for every possible observation D ∈ O yields the
sought information on the model parameters, in a given model class M =Mj, as ‖
f(θ,Mj) =
∫
O
f(D,θ,Mj)dD =
∫
O
f o(D)f o(θ)f o(Mj)f
m(D,θ,Mj)dD (16)
4.3. Formulation for general ideal, real and observed output255
In addition to the a priori information provided by f o and the information given by the256
model through fm, the uncertainty introduced by the idealization of the model and from257
the sensors can be defined by two new probability densities f i and f s respectively. Their258
treatment is detailed below.259
‖ The interpretation of the updated information for identifying the most plausible model parameter
just requires to find its maximum, known as the “maximum a posteriori”, (MAP)
MAP = argmax
θ∈Θ
f(θ,Mj)
whereas finding plausible model values, or just falsifying inconsistent models, requires comparing
information densities, and therefore a normalization. This can be done just by defining a normalized
probability density p that satisfies the third Kolmogorov axiom (theorem of total probability),
p(θ) =
f(θ)∫
Θ
f(y)dy
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f o(Dreal,Dideal,Dobs,θ,Mj) = f
o(Dobs)f o(Dideal)f o(θ)f o(Mj)µ(D
real) The260
prior informations about each magnitude are independent, so they are split as a261
product. The readings from the sensors are expressed as the prior information on262
the observations as f o(Dobs). If some prior information about the system output is263
available (for example physically impossible values), it can be coded by f o(Dideal)264
and allows, as an example, to reject outliers among the measurements. Since no265
prior information can be given about the real output, its independent probability is266
non-informative µ(Dreal). Prior knowledge about the model and the class are given267
by f o(θ) and f o(Mj).268
f s(Dreal,Dideal,Dobs,θ,Mj) = f
s(Dobs,Dideal)µ(θ)µ(Mj)µ(D
real) . Since the269
sensor only relates observations to real output by adding noise as described in270
Equation 4, which is quantified by the joint density f s(Dobs,Dideal), the remaining271
magnitudes are independent and non-informative, µ(θ), µ(Mj) and µ(D
real).272
f i(Dreal,Dideal,Dobs,θ,Mj) = f
i(Dreal,Dideal)µ(θ)µ(Mj)µ(D
obs) . Since the273
idealization only relates ideal to real output by adding the prediction error as274
described in Equation 5, which is quantified by the joint density f s(Dreal,Dideal),275
the remaining magnitudes are independent and non-informative, µ(θ), µ(Mj) and276
µ(Dobs).277
fm(Dreal,Dideal,Dobs,θ,Mj) = f
i(Dreal,Dideal)µ(θ)µ(Mj)µ(D
obs) . The model278
only exists in the “ideal world” and therefore only relates ideal output with model279
parameters given a model class by the density fm(Dideal,θ,Mj). The remaining280
magnitudes µ(Dobs) and µ(Dreal) are independent and non-informative.281
These four pieces of information are simultaneously true yielding a joint probability282
through the conjunction operator,283
f(Dreal,Dideal,Dobs,θ,Mj) = f
o(Dreal,Dideal,Dobs,θ,Mj)f
s(Dreal,Dideal,
Dobs,θ,Mj)f
i(Dreal,Dideal,Dobs,θ,Mj)f
m(Dreal,Dideal,Dobs,θ,Mj)
(17)
In the case of Jeffreys parameters, which have the characteristic of being positive and of284
being as popular as their inverses [17], all non-informative densities µ are constant and285
may therefore be dropped from the formulation. By further marginalizing, the sought286
information is given by,287
f(θ,Mj) =
∫
Dreal
∫
Dideal
∫
Dobs
f o(Dobs)f o(Dideal)f o(θ)f o(Mj)f
s(Dobs,Dideal)
f i(Dreal,Dideal)fm(Dideal,θ,Mj)dD
obsdDidealdDreal
(18)
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4.4. Reconstruction of the model parameters288
Without loss of generality, and for a simpler notation, we may restrict ourselves to the289
case when observations are perfect, i.e. discrepancy due to sensor or idealization is290
negligible, Dreal = Dideal = Dobs = D.291
The reconstructed probability for the model parameters θ providing the model292
class Mj is obtained from the joint probability f(D,θ,M) by extracting the marginal293
probability for all possible observations D ∈ O and provided the model class Mj ∈ M294
is assumed to be true (f 0(M =Mj) = 1) as,295
f(θ)
∣∣
M=Mj
=
∫
M=Mj
∫
O
f(D,θ,M)dDdM = k1
∫
O
f 0(D)f 0(θ)fm(D,θ,Mj)dD (19)
where k1 is a normalization constant that replaces the dropped model class probability.296
The assumption of no prior knowledge about the model parameters is usually made,297
whereby it is represented by the non-informative distribution, i.e. an arbitrary constant298
in the assumed case of Jeffrey’s parameters f 0(θ) = 1,299
f(θ)
∣∣
M=Mj
= k1
∫
O
f 0(D)fm(D,θ,Mj)dD (20)
If we assume the hypothesis of negligible observational uncertainties with respect300
to modelization uncertainties (f 0(D) = f 0(Dobs)) and that the data manifold D is a301
linear space (whereby the noninformative homogeneous probability density µ(Dreal) is a302
constant), hence the integral in Equation 20 vanishes yielding the reconstructed model303
parameters probability density, which is clarified by the example in the next section,304
f(θ)
∣∣
M=Mj
= k2f
m(Dobs,θ,Mj) (21)
The latter formulation is equivalent to the one obtained from the probability logic305
viewpoint in Equation 10 (after dropping the prior model parameter information for306
being assumed noninformative), except for a constant since fm needs not range [0, 1],307
which proves the correctness and unifies both approaches.308
5. Solution for time-domain observations with gaussian uncertainties309
Either the final expressions of the probability densities p from the probability logic,310
or f from the conjunction of states of information can be treated as follows, as311
both final expressions are equivalent. Assume that the observations are assumed312
to follow a Gaussian distribution D ∼ N (E[Dobs], Cobs) whose mean is that of313
the experimental observations Dobs and covariance matrix Cobs standing for the314
measurement error noise. Likewise, the numerical errors are also assumed to follow a315
Gaussian distribution D ∼ N (Dnum, Cnum) centered at the numerically computed ones316
E[Dnum] = D(M) with covariance matrix Cnum.317
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Assume that the observations D are a vector of functions of time D = oi(t) at318
every measuring time t ∈ [0, T ] and repetition i ∈ [1...Ni], and that the assumptions319
made above are valid for every instant t and sensor i. Considering that the compound320
probability of the information from all sensors and time instants is the productory of321
that of each one individually, what means information independence, and that this322
productory is equivalent to a summation within the exponentiation (and an integration323
along the continuous time, seen as a summation over every infinitesimal dt), the Gaussian324
distribution allows for an explicit expression of the probability densities,325
f 0(oi(t)) = k3e


−
1
2
Ni∑
i,j=1
∫ t=T
t=0
(
oi(t)− o
obs
i (t)
)
(
cobsij
)−1 (
oj(t)− o
obs
j (t)
)
dt


(22)
fm(oi(t),θ,M) = k4e


−
1
2
Ni∑
i,j=1
∫ t=T
t=0
(oi(t)− oi(t,θ))(
cnumij
)−1
(oj(t)− oj(t,θ)) dt


(23)
⇒ f(θ)
∣∣
M=Mj
= k5e
J(θ)︷ ︸︸ ︷
 −
1
2
Ni∑
i,j=1
∫ t=T
t=0
(
oi(t,θ)− o
obs
i (t)
)
(
cobsij + c
num
ij
)−1 (
oj(t,θ)− o
obs
j (t)
)
dt


(24)
The term J(θ) corresponds to a misfit function between model and observations,326
then327
f(θ)
∣∣
M=Mj
= k5e
−J(θ) (25)
The best-fitting model is found by minimizing J(θ), or equivalently maximizing328
f(θ), since329
θˆ = argmax
θ∈Θ
{
f(θ)
∣∣
M=Mj
= k5e
−J(θ)
}
= argmin
θ∈Θ
{J(θ)} (26)
Finally, if classical probability densities are desired, the constant k6 is derived from330
the theorem of total probability as,331
I =
∫
Θ
e−J(θ)dθ =
∫
Θ
f(θ)
∣∣
M=Mj
k5
dθ =
1
k6
(27)
6. Extension to model-class selection332
This formulation can be generalized to the case when several model classes M are333
candidates to idealize the real excitation-observation. Including this variable into the334
Logical inference for inverse problems 14
inverse problem formulation will allow to derive the model-class selection as a particular335
case of inverse problem.336
As introduced in the preceding subsection, the probabilistic nature of the337
reconstruction is partly motivated by the fact that the model itself may not necessarily338
reproduce the experimental setup, but is just an approximation. If several models are339
candidates based on different hypothesis about the system, the former probabilistic340
formulation of the inverse problem will be shown to be able to provide information to341
rank them. The bottom idea is the following: if the model-class (based on the candidate342
hypothesis) is considered as an uncertain discrete variable, its probability can eventually343
be extracted as a marginal probability from Equation 15. The probability of each model-344
class will therefore have the sense of degree of certainty of being true in the sense that345
the probabilistic conjunction of certainty (or information) provided by the experimental346
measurements and model are coherent.347
Let model class M denote an idealized mathematical model hypothesized to348
simulate the experimental system, whereas model θ denotes the set of constants of349
physical parameters that the model-class depends on. Different model classes can350
be formulated and hypothesized to idealize the experimental system, and each of351
them can be used to solve the probabilistic inverse problem in the previous section,352
yielding different values of model parameters but also physically different sets of353
parameters. To select among the infinitely many possible model classes that can354
be defined, user judgement is a criteria, but a probabilistic one can also be defined355
based on their compatibility between prior information f 0(D,θ,M) on observations356
D, model parameters θ and model class M, and probabilistic model information given357
by fm(D,θ,M). The conjunction of probabilities established in Equation 15 will be358
adopted instead of Bayes’ theorem, for its generality [22].359
The goal is to find the probability f(M), understood as a measure of plausibility360
of a model class M [23]. It can be derived as the marginal probability of the posterior361
probability f(D,θ,M) defined in Equation 15,362
f(M) =
∫
D
∫
Θ
f(D,θ,M)dθdD (28)
= k1f
0(M)
∫
D
∫
Θ
f 0(D)f 0(θ)fm(D,θ,M)dθdD
If no prior information is provided by the user about the class f 0(M) =363
µ(M) ⇒ k1f
0(M) = k6. Furthermore, this theorem involves exactly the same integral364
as that for the constant k5, i.e., allowing to reuse the integral in Equation 27,365
f(M) = k6
∫
Θ
f(θ)
∣∣
M=Mi
k5
dθ = k6
∫
Θ
e−J(θ)dθ = k6I (29)
where the normalization constant k6 can be solved from the theorem of total probability366
over all model classes M in order to obtain probabilities in the classical sense,367
Logical inference for inverse problems 15
∑
M
f(M) = 1 (30)
Variations of the probability density at good or bad models may exceed the floating368
point representation range of a standard operating system. To override this limitation,369
an alternative computation is proposed in the logarithmic scale. This is carried out370
redefining all involved PDF in the −ln scale and redefining their relationships as371
f˜ = −ln(f) or f = e−p˜. Variables expressed in the logarithmic scale are tagged with a372
tilde (˜ ).373
Once the plausibility f(M) is computed for every class, its value allows to rank the374
models accordingly to how compatible they are with the observations. This also allows375
us to find a correct trade-off between model simplicity and fitting to observations [22, 20].376
7. Conclusions377
The inverse problem of parameter reconstruction from experimental data when a model378
is available has been derived in a probabilistic way from the theory of conjunction379
of states of information from observations combined with models. This approach is380
proposed as an alternative to the logical inference using Bayes theorem, as it relies381
on different statistical axioms and may be useful. Among them, the input-output382
relationship needs not to be causal, the axioms that allow the concept conditional383
probability are not needed, and the incorporation of additional sources of information384
beyond observation and model become straightforward. As an example of the latter,385
the extension to model-class selection is derived in a simple way. The validity of the386
approach is supported by the fact that the final computations are the same for a typical387
linear gaussian inverse problem.388
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